Whole-of-government economic statecraft

Whole-of-government economic statecraft is the co-ordination of objectives, intelligence, legal authorities, instrument choice, implementation, enforcement and assessment across the public institutions relevant to an economic strategy. It applies across positive and negative modes of economic statecraft. Economic warfare is one possible mode, not the umbrella.

Strategic position

Economic instruments are normally distributed across finance, trade, foreign affairs, development, industry, energy, security, intelligence and regulatory bodies. Whole-of-government practice seeks coherence around shared objectives while preserving each institution's lawful authority. It does not necessarily require a single command structure.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development treats whole-of-government approaches as a co-ordination problem across mandates, incentives and information. Official strategies show that the principle has entered economic-security practice. The United States Treasury's 2021 sanctions review describes close partnership with the State Department, National Security Council and Justice Department. The United Kingdom's 2024 sanctions strategy assigns responsibilities across government and emphasises co-ordinated design, implementation and enforcement. Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy calls for whole-of-government implementation of economic-security policies. These sources establish co-ordination commitments, not one universal institutional model.

Functions

A whole-of-government arrangement can perform six functions:

1. set a shared strategic objective;
2. assemble relevant economic, legal and intelligence assessments;
3. select and sequence instruments;
4. identify conflicts among programmes and authorities;
5. organise implementation, enforcement and allied co-ordination;
6. assess campaign outcomes rather than agency activity alone.

The institutional form depends on constitutional structure. Cabinet committees, ministerial processes, national-security councils, interagency task forces and specialist fusion centres distribute authority differently. Legislative oversight, judicial review, due process, data protection and administrative expertise are constraints to be designed around, not frictions to be removed.

Tennant integrated-campaign model

James J. Tennant's unpublished 2026 manuscript proposes a stronger integrated-campaign model built around fused intelligence, campaign direction, deconfliction and campaign-level assessment. Tennant and his co-authors James Corera, Alice Hudson and John Coyne also argue publicly for deeper Australian integration in their 2026 Australian Strategic Policy Institute report.

Those recommendations go beyond the official sources. The proposition that authority should be transferred rather than shared, or that one centre should direct every economic instrument, is not settled doctrine. The unpublished manuscript remains a qualified source and cannot establish adopted doctrine. The public ASPI report supports the case for deeper integration but does not prove that its recommended architecture has been adopted or that it fits every democratic system.

Effects, evidence and limits

Co-ordination can reduce contradictory policies, improve legal preparation and align sanctions, export controls, investment policy, aid and industrial support with a common objective. It can also centralise error, weaken specialist challenge, obscure accountability or over-securitise ordinary economic policy. Redundancy may protect continuity and provide lawful checks.

Assessment should distinguish observed arrangements, published commitments and editorial recommendations. Claims about the number of offices, powers or departments require an official count and review date. Historical examples also need institutional evidence. The Marshall Plan and Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls do not by themselves prove that Cold War economic policy operated as one integrated command.

The concept therefore requires constitutional and reputational review. Effective co-ordination means clear objectives, authorities, responsibility and feedback. It does not mean treating democratic fragmentation as failure whenever several institutions retain independent powers.

See also

Economic statecraft · Interagency synchronisation · Organised to fail · Fused intelligence · Economic coercion doctrine (the doctrinal gap) · Integrated deterrence (United States, 2022) · Allied financial targeting coordination · Tool selection and sequencing

Sources

• US Department of the Treasury, The Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review (October 2021).
• Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Deter, Disrupt and Demonstrate: UK Sanctions in a Contested World (22 February 2024).
• Government of Japan, National Security Strategy of Japan (December 2022).
• James J. Tennant, James Corera, Alice Hudson and John Coyne, Markets as the New Front Line: Fusing Australia's Economic Statecraft (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 27 March 2026).
• Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States, OECD Journal on Development 8, no. 3 (2008).
• James J. Tennant, "Organized to Fail: The Institutional Architecture of American Economic Warfare" (Article 9, PhD corpus, unpublished manuscript, 2026).