Economic coercion doctrine (the doctrinal gap)

The economic-coercion doctrinal-gap thesis is James J. Tennant's policy argument that some states organise the planning, legal authority, intelligence, execution and assessment of economic coercion across fragmented institutions, reducing campaign coherence. It concerns the institutional practice of economic statecraft, not the absence of economic instruments. The size and nature of any gap must be tested jurisdiction by jurisdiction against published doctrine, authorities and operating arrangements.

The thesis

Economic campaigns often cross treasury, trade, foreign-affairs, defence, intelligence, law-enforcement and private-sector systems. Fragmentation can create unclear ownership, inconsistent objectives, slow coalition coordination, weak assessment and difficulty connecting relief to compliance. A doctrine can provide common definitions, decision rights, legal review, target selection, sequencing, implementation and evaluation.

The thesis does not establish that civilian location is a defect. Sanctions and export controls usually depend on civilian legal authority, regulatory legitimacy and commercial implementation. Defence integration may improve planning in some circumstances while militarising policy in others. The analytical question is whether existing institutions can define objectives, coordinate instruments, assess effects and terminate or adjust measures, not whether a defence ministry owns them.

Evidence of doctrine and fragmentation

Public documents contradict any blanket assertion that Western states lack doctrine. The US Treasury's 2021 Sanctions Review set out five recommendations, including clear policy objectives, multilateral coordination, mitigation of unintended effects, modernised capabilities and calibration for reversibility. It demonstrates a structured policy framework within a civilian department, although it does not settle how sanctions integrate with other instruments across the United States government.

The UK Ministry of Defence's Joint Doctrine Note 2/20 on threat finance and economic levers likewise demonstrates that relevant doctrine exists. It also records integration, ownership and coordination problems. The same document can therefore support a bounded gap thesis while disproving a claim of total doctrinal absence.

Paul Bracken's 2007 analysis of financial warfare identifies cross-domain planning and organisational problems. Alex Zerden and Leland Smith argue in practitioner commentary for a more operational US economic-statecraft doctrine. These sources support a live institutional debate, not a universal empirical finding.

Comparative claims

Comparative assessment must distinguish law, military scholarship, executive policy and operational doctrine. China's 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, supplemented by State Council implementation provisions effective on 23 March 2025, is a legal countermeasure framework. It should not be redescribed as an economic kill chain or as proof of integrated military-economic command. The Science of Military Strategy 2020 is an influential text prepared by the PLA National Defense University and made available in machine translation by the US Air University's China Aerospace Studies Institute. It can illuminate Chinese military thinking, but it is not itself binding legislation or conclusive evidence of national operating doctrine.

The same standard applies elsewhere. References to Russian new-generation warfare, private proxies or state-linked firms require exact sources establishing the doctrine, institution and strategic act. Similarity between a commercial outcome and a theoretical campaign sequence does not establish coordination.

Proposed institutional response

Tennant's public 2025 Strategist article proposes an Australian unit dedicated to financial-warfare capabilities. His unpublished work also presents an Economic Kill Chain as a planning framework. These are attributed policy proposals, not settled doctrine or independent proof that existing arrangements have failed.

James J. Tennant, James Corera, Alice Hudson and John Coyne develop a broader Australian integration argument in the 2026 ASPI report Markets as the New Front Line. Its recommendations must be credited to all four authors on first reference and assessed against the institutions and authorities current at the date of review.

A proportionate institutional response need not create a military command. Options include a central coordinating office, standing interagency process, common campaign-assessment standard, embedded legal review, financial-intelligence capacity and pre-arranged coalition consultation. The correct model depends on constitutional arrangements, market structure and the instruments in scope.

Contestation and limits

Doctrine may improve consistency while creating false confidence. Economic effects depend on private risk decisions, third-country substitution, market expectations and political adaptation. A phase model can clarify assumptions without making those effects controllable.

Routinisation also carries legal and strategic risk. Highly integrated coercive machinery may lower the political threshold for use, produce over-compliance or blur the boundary between regulation and conflict. Assessment of the doctrinal gap should therefore compare specific institutions against defined functions, identify what is missing and state the cost of the proposed remedy. Until that comparative work and stable provenance for Tennant's unpublished frameworks are complete, the thesis remains a qualified editorial proposition.

See also

Economic statecraft · Economic coercion · Economic Kill Chain (EKC) · Financial intelligence (FININT) · Integrated deterrence (United States, 2022) · Defensive resilience doctrine · Financial warfare · Finance as a domain of warfare (the sixth domain thesis)

Sources

• US Department of the Treasury, The Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review (2021).
• UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Note 2/20: Threat Finance and the Economic Levers of Power (2020).
• National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted 10 June 2021, official Chinese text.
• State Council of the People's Republic of China, Provisions on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China, State Council Decree No. 803, 23 March 2025, official Chinese text.
• PLA National Defense University, The Science of Military Strategy 2020, machine translation by the China Aerospace Studies Institute (Air University, 2022).
• Paul Bracken, "Financial Warfare," Orbis 51, no. 4 (2007): 685-696.
• Alex Zerden and Leland Smith, "Operationalizing a Doctrine for U.S. Economic Statecraft," War on the Rocks, 12 April 2024.
• James J. Tennant, "Australia Should Establish a Unit Dedicated to Financial Warfare Capabilities," The Strategist, 21 May 2025.
• James J. Tennant, James Corera, Alice Hudson and John Coyne, Markets as the New Front Line: Fusing Australia's Economic Statecraft (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2026).