Ansar Allah attacks on Red Sea shipping (2023-present)

Ansar Allah attacks on Red Sea shipping (2023-present) are a campaign of missile, drone, uncrewed craft, boarding and detention operations in and around the Red Sea. Ansar Allah, commonly called the Houthi movement, publicly linked the campaign to the Gaza war and later regional hostilities. The attacks changed shipping routes, insurance decisions and naval deployments. This is wartime economic action by a non-state de facto authority with a contested state nexus, not proof that Iran directed every incident or that the strait was physically closed.

Conflict record current to 29 July 2026. The incident register and legal position require rechecking within 24 hours of publication.

Campaign phases

The campaign opened on 19 November 2023 with the seizure of Galaxy Leader. Attacks then expanded through 2024. Ansar Allah described targeted vessels as linked to Israel or as violating its announced restrictions, but ownership, management, flag, charter, cargo, port history and the attacker's stated rationale must be tested for each incident. A declared targeting policy does not establish that every vessel had the claimed link.

The United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023 to protect freedom of navigation. The European Union launched EUNAVFOR ASPIDES in February 2024 with a defensive mandate. United States and United Kingdom strikes in Yemen were separate offensive operations. The United States Department of Defense expressly separated the January 2024 strikes from Prosperity Guardian.

The campaign moved through changing phases in 2025. The crew of Galaxy Leader was released in January. Oman announced an understanding on 6 May under which the United States and the authorities in Sana'a would not target each other, including American vessels. The agreement was not a general ceasefire covering Israel, every commercial vessel or the Gaza conflict. Attacks on Magic Seas and Eternity C in July 2025 caused ship losses and crew harm, with final incident facts to be taken from the latest record rather than initial provisional counts.

The record remains open. The International Maritime Organization condemned renewed attacks on 23 July 2026. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES had been extended to 28 February 2027. No fixed total of attacked or damaged vessels is used here because counts change with the date, geographic boundary and inclusion rule.

State nexus and transmission

Ansar Allah controls territory in Yemen and possesses anti-ship weapons and boarding capacity. Iranian material support and weapons assistance are documented at a general level. That evidence does not establish Iranian direction of each attack or overall operational control. Iran is therefore an intermediary or supporter where evidence identifies assistance, not automatically a co-sender.

Economic effects passed through risk decisions. Shipowners and charterers diverted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, insurers changed terms and premiums, and navies deployed to protect traffic. Freight rates, war-risk premiums, Suez traffic and Egyptian canal revenue are different measures. Each requires its own period, route and comparator. Diversion time also varies by origin, destination, vessel speed, port sequence and weather.

Outcome and assessment

The campaign killed, injured and detained seafarers, damaged and sank ships and imposed persistent commercial and naval costs. Naval defence and strikes intercepted threats and damaged capabilities without ending the campaign. Shipping adapted through rerouting rather than submitting to a durable closure of the route.

Ansar Allah gained attention and imposed costs, but evidence that the campaign compelled Israel or its supporters to change core policy is weak. The attacks occurred amid overlapping regional hostilities. This entry classifies the economic instrument as wartime action while leaving the legal classification of particular conflicts, targets and responses to incident-specific specialist analysis.

Environmental damage, supply-chain disruption and effects on aid require separate pathways and sources. Somali piracy and armed robbery in the same maritime area are distinct threats and are not included in this campaign record.

See also

Maritime chokepoint interdiction · Chokepoint effect · Insurance and reinsurance withdrawal · War-risk insurance manipulation · Naval blockade · Strategic node (critical hub) · Economic warfare · Economic Kill Chain (EKC)

Sources

• United Nations Security Council, 'Resolution 2722)' (10 January 2024).
• United Nations Security Council, 'Resolution 2826)' (14 July 2026).
• United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, Final report, S/2025/650 (15 October 2025).
• International Maritime Organization, 'Red Sea area' (incident register checked 29 July 2026).
• International Maritime Organization, 'Report on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels' (updated to 9 July 2025).
• International Maritime Organization, 'Statement on recent attacks on ships in the Red Sea' (23 July 2026).
• United Nations Secretary-General, 'Statement on attacks in the Red Sea' (11 July 2025).
• United States Department of Defense, 'Statement on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea' (18 December 2023).
• United States Department of Defense, 'United States and partner forces strike Houthi military targets in Yemen' (12 January 2024).
• Council of the European Union, 'Council launches EUNAVFOR ASPIDES' (19 February 2024).
• Council of the European Union, 'Council extends the mandate of Operation ASPIDES' (23 February 2026).
• Oman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Oman announces ceasefire agreement between Washington and Sanaa' (6 May 2025).
• United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Navigating Troubled Waters: Impact to Global Trade of Disruption of Shipping Routes in the Red Sea, Black Sea and Panama Canal (22 February 2024).
• International Monetary Fund, 'Red Sea attacks disrupt global trade' (7 March 2024).
• United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran: Enabling Houthi Attacks Across the Middle East (2024), treated as an interested official assessment.
• International Committee of the Red Cross, 'Waging warfare at sea: how exceptional is the maritime domain today?' (10 February 2026).