The Encyclopedia of Economic Statecraft

Case

ASML and the Netherlands-Japan lithography alignment (2019-2023)

Version 2.0.0-alphaLast reviewed 29 July 2026Editorially checkedAll rights reserved

The United States, Netherlands and Japan established separate but aligned controls over specified advanced semiconductor-manufacturing equipment between 2019 and 2023. The public record proves the national measures and their security rationales. It does not disclose one binding trilateral agreement or establish that the Netherlands and Japan acted only because of United States coercion.

Technology and jurisdictional setting

ASML is the exclusive producer of extreme-ultraviolet lithography systems and a leading supplier of advanced deep-ultraviolet systems. Nikon and Canon compete in parts of lithography, while Tokyo Electron and other Japanese firms supply adjacent equipment. This concentration makes national export licensing a potential technology chokepoint.

ASML's company reporting records that it had not shipped an extreme-ultraviolet system to China because the necessary Dutch export licence was not granted. The 2019 episode concerned extreme-ultraviolet equipment. Later Dutch controls also reached specified advanced deep-ultraviolet and related equipment. The two machine classes must not be conflated, and ASML should not be called the sole producer of every lithography system.

United States rules can reach United States-origin items, persons and certain foreign-produced goods, but they do not automatically create Dutch or Japanese law. The Bureau of Industry and Security's 7 October 2022 controls restricted advanced computing and semiconductor-manufacturing items to China. Their design increased the strategic value of parallel action by other equipment-producing jurisdictions.

Dutch and Japanese measures

The Netherlands set out its policy in a 10 March 2023 letter to Parliament. The national measure entered into force on 1 September 2023, as confirmed in the government's 2023 strategic-goods report. It imposed an authorisation requirement for specified exports outside the European Union. It was not a universal export ban.

Japan added 23 categories of semiconductor-manufacturing equipment under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, effective 23 July 2023. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's 2024 White Paper records the measure. The responsible minister stated on 4 April 2023 that Japan's action was destination-neutral and not simple compliance with a United States request. Destination-specific licensing treatment still made the measure material to Chinese access.

The national legal acts establish alignment in effect. External reporting and sequence support an inference of extensive allied coordination, closing substitution routes and slowing Chinese capacity. Public sources do not establish the full content of any confidential understanding, and the allies' stated security rationales should not be replaced by a claim of subordination.

The United States strengthened its controls in October 2023 and again in December 2024. These later amendments are an epilogue to the 2019 to 2023 case, not part of the entry's end date.

The Netherlands expanded its national measure from 7 September 2024 and tightened it again from 1 April 2025. ASML's January 2024 statement concerned partial revocation of licences for NXT:2050i and NXT:2100i advanced deep-ultraviolet systems, not extreme-ultraviolet machines.

ASML's 2023 and 2025 annual reports provide dated company accounts of regulation, sales and commercial exposure. Revenue or order intake measures incidence on the supplier. They do not establish the effect on Chinese technological capacity.

Assessment

The measures created an aligned licensing barrier across three leading equipment jurisdictions. They denied or conditioned access to specified tools and reduced some substitution options. Chinese stockpiling, use of installed systems, indigenous development and other supplier pathways mean that long-term capability effects remain unresolved.

This is peacetime competitive statecraft through direct public regulation and private compliance by controlled exporters. No direct humanitarian effect is established. Current law, licensing scope and company exposure require a fresh check before publication because all three regimes continued to change after the case period.

See also

Extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography · Deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography · Semiconductor and lithography equipment denial · Multilateral chip-control coalition · US-Japan-Netherlands semiconductor control coalition · United States advanced-computing and semiconductor controls on China (2022-present) · China's gallium and germanium export-control campaign (2023-present) · Chokepoint effect · Strategic node (critical hub)

Sources

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Cite this entry

Tennant, James J., ed. 'ASML and the Netherlands-Japan lithography alignment (2019-2023).' The Encyclopedia of Economic Statecraft, version 2.0.0-alpha, last reviewed 29 July 2026. https://jamesjtennant.com/entries/asml-and-the-netherlands-japan-lithography-alignment-2019-2023/.

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