Use of extraordinary revenues from immobilised Russian sovereign assets and G7 ERA loans (2024-present)

The use of extraordinary revenues from immobilised Russian sovereign assets converted earnings generated at central securities depositories into a source of support for Ukraine. The underlying Russian central-bank assets remained immobilised. European Union rules required central securities depositories to segregate extraordinary cash balances and net profits arising from that immobilisation. The G7 then used expected future revenues to support approximately USD 50 billion in Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans.

Asset and revenue distinction

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, participating jurisdictions prohibited transactions involving Russian central-bank reserves within their reach. The assets were immobilised rather than transferred to the sanctioning states. As securities matured and cash accumulated, central securities depositories earned interest and other revenue on the resulting balances.

Council Regulation 2024/576 and Council Decision 2024/577 created segregation and accounting obligations. Regulation 2024/1469 established a contribution from net profits for Ukraine support. These measures targeted extraordinary revenues recognised under the European Union framework. They did not confiscate the Russian-owned principal.

That distinction is legally and financially central. Gross interest, accounting profit, tax, retained capital and the contribution available for Ukraine are different figures. Euroclear's reports provide institution-specific numbers, not the entire global stock.

ERA loan mechanism

At the June 2024 G7 summit, leaders agreed to an ERA initiative of approximately USD 50 billion. Participating members later allocated national shares. The European Union created a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and a macro-financial-assistance loan through Regulation 2024/2773. The United States and other lenders used bilateral or intermediary structures.

Ukraine remains formally liable under loan agreements. The political and financial design intends debt service to come from extraordinary revenues through the cooperation mechanism. That arrangement reduces the expected budget burden but does not make the instruments legally not debt.

Commitment, signed agreement, transfer to an intermediary and disbursement to Ukraine must be reported separately. Currency conversion also means national headline commitments cannot be added without a common date and exchange rate.

Legal and strategic questions

The mechanism sought a path between immobilisation and confiscation. Supporters argue that the revenues can be used consistently with sanctions and international law. Critics raise sovereign-immunity, property-rights, countermeasure and reserve-system concerns. Those legal arguments remain contested and differ between principal and revenue.

The legal setting continued to change after the ERA structure was adopted. The European Union introduced temporary measures in December 2025 preventing transfers of immobilised Central Bank of Russia assets back to Russia. On 1 April 2026, the Commission announced a further EUR 1.4 billion in extraordinary-revenue support, with 95 per cent directed through the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and 5 per cent through the European Peace Facility. These were uses of revenue, not transfers of principal.

The separate EUR 90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027 is not another ERA tranche. It is a European Union capital-market borrowing programme with a different legal and repayment structure. Conflating it with ERA would double count support and blur the difference between extraordinary-revenue servicing, possible future reparations and the continued immobilisation of principal.

Strategically, the structure turns continued immobilisation into a financing stream. It also creates duration risk. Revenue depends on interest rates, asset maturity, sanctions continuity, depository balances and legal arrangements. A future peace settlement or release decision could alter the stream before every loan matures.

Assessment

This is a main-sequence case of asset control and coalition finance during war. It supports Ukraine while preserving a legal distinction between immobilised principal and generated revenue. That distinction limits immediate escalation but increases complexity and future dependence.

The case should not be described as simple confiscation or cost-free reparations. Its strategic innovation is the use of expected revenue to front-load public lending. Current totals, regulations and disbursements require a publication-day lock.

See also

Coalition immobilisation of Central Bank of Russia reserves (2022-present) · Sovereign immunity of central bank assets · Central-bank reserve immobilisation · Third-party countermeasures · Financial warfare

Sources

1. Council of the European Union, 'Council Regulation (EU) 2024/576', 12 February 2024.
2. Council of the European Union, 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/577', 12 February 2024.
3. Council of the European Union, 'Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1469', 21 May 2024.
4. European Parliament and Council, 'Regulation (EU) 2024/2773', 24 October 2024.
5. G7, 'Finance Ministers' Statement on the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan Initiative', 25 October 2024.
6. G7, 'Apulia G7 Leaders' Communique', 14 June 2024.
7. United States Department of the Treasury, 'United States transfers USD 20 billion for Ukraine', 10 December 2024.
8. European Commission, Report on the implementation of the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, 2025.
9. Euroclear, Annual Reports, extraordinary-revenue and contribution disclosures.
10. World Bank, Facilitation of Resources to Invest in Strengthening Ukraine Financial Intermediary Fund, current fund records.
11. Council of the European Union, 'European Union financial assistance to Ukraine', status reviewed 27 July 2026.
12. European Commission, 'EUR 1.4 billion in revenue from immobilised Russian assets to be used for support to Ukraine', 1 April 2026.