CFA franc monetary-cooperation arrangements (1945-present)

The CFA franc monetary-cooperation arrangements are separate treaty-based systems linking West African and Central African monetary unions, Comoros and France. They shape convertibility, reserve management, parity decisions, governance and the cost of exit. They are relevant to structural monetary power, but they do not constitute one currency or a discrete coercive campaign. This entry therefore belongs in context.

Three arrangements

The Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest issues the West African CFA franc, XOF, for members of the West African monetary union. The Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale issues the Central African CFA franc, XAF, for members of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community. Both have a fixed parity of 655.957 units to €1 and benefit from a French Treasury convertibility guarantee under different legal agreements. XOF and XAF are not one currency and are not freely interchangeable as a single monetary area.

Comoros has a separate monetary-cooperation agreement and currency issued by the Central Bank of Comoros. The Comorian franc forms part of the wider franc-zone cooperation family, but it is not a CFA franc. Claims about reserve custody, representation or operations accounts must therefore identify the currency, central bank and applicable agreement.

Reform and continuing asymmetry

The West African arrangement changed after the December 2019 agreement. France and the West African parties retained the fixed euro parity and convertibility guarantee while ending the requirement that BCEAO deposit part of its foreign reserves in an operations account at the French Treasury and removing French representatives from BCEAO governance bodies. Those reforms did not apply to the Central African arrangement.

The Central African system retained its own operations-account and governance features. BEAC's audited 2024 report and 2025 financial statements provide the relevant accounting evidence. They should not be replaced by pre-reform West African figures or claims that all regional reserves remain under one custody rule. French and CEMAC ministers continued to describe their relationship as monetary cooperation in March 2026.

The January 1994 devaluation affected both CFA currencies after a multilateral crisis negotiation involving member governments, regional institutions, France and the International Monetary Fund. France possessed substantial bargaining power, but the record does not support describing the decision as a unilateral order without reconstructing the roles and formal decisions of all parties.

Assessment

Supporters credit the arrangements with convertibility, lower inflation and regional payment continuity. Critics argue that fixed parity, guarantee conditions, governance and exit costs preserve asymmetric French influence and constrain monetary sovereignty. Each claim requires a defined period and comparator. Inflation, growth, competitiveness, capital movement and crisis resilience have different causes and cannot be inferred from institutional design alone.

This is a context case of enduring order-building and contested structural power. Treaty consent does not eliminate bargaining asymmetry, while asymmetry does not by itself prove a continuing French coercive purpose. Discrete interventions over parity, reserves, guarantee conditions or exit would require separate case records with their own direction and intent evidence.

See also

Weaponised interdependence · Currency warfare · Dollar hegemony and exorbitant privilege · IMF programme conditionality and geopolitical influence · Economic statecraft

Sources

1. Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, 'Reforme du franc CFA', December 2019.
2. French Treasury, 'Reforme des relations de cooperation monetaire entre l'UEMOA et la France', 23 December 2019.
3. French Treasury, 'Les accords de cooperation monetaire des annees 1970'.
4. French Treasury, 'Les principes et modalites de fonctionnement de la cooperation monetaire'.
5. Government of France, Etude d'impact: accord de cooperation entre la France et les gouvernements des Etats membres de l'Union monetaire ouest-africaine (2020).
6. Council of the European Union, Decision 98/683/EC concerning exchange-rate matters relating to the CFA franc and the Comorian franc, 23 November 1998.
7. Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale, Rapport special du commissaire aux comptes sur le controle du compte d'operations, exercice 2024 (2025).
8. Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale, Etats financiers et notes annexes IFRS, exercice 2025 (2026).
9. French Treasury, 'Renforcement du partenariat economique et monetaire entre la France et la CEMAC', 23 March 2026.
10. Anne-Marie Gulde and Charalambos Tsangarides, eds., The CFA Franc Zone: Common Currency, Uncommon Challenges (International Monetary Fund, 2008).
11. Patrick Imam, 'The CFA Franc Arrangements: More than Just an Aid Substitute', IMF Working Paper 07/19 (2007).
12. Fanny Pigeaud and Ndongo Samba Sylla, Africa's Last Colonial Currency: The CFA Franc Story (Pluto Press, 2021).