Antimony, tungsten and defence-critical metals

Antimony, tungsten and defence-critical metals are material inputs whose specialised uses, concentrated processing and long qualification cycles can turn trade policy into leverage over industrial and defence production. States can act through export licensing, military end-use rules, state trading, stockpiling, investment controls and industrial mobilisation. Leverage depends on control of a specified material, processing stage or technology, not a headline share of geological reserves.

Function and control points

Antimony is used in flame retardants, alloys, ammunition-related applications, electronics and other specialised products. Tungsten combines high density, hardness and heat resistance; its uses include cemented-carbide cutting tools, industrial alloys, aerospace components and munitions.

The supply chain runs through mining, concentration, refining, high-purity processing, component fabrication, customer qualification and final integration. Control can sit at any stage. Mine production cannot immediately replace a lost refiner, high-purity processor or qualified component. A project announcement or public award also does not create supply. Replacement capacity passes through funding, permitting, construction, commissioning, technical qualification and commercial output.

Criticality is a policy assessment, not a synonym for physical scarcity. The European Union lists tungsten as both a strategic and critical raw material and antimony as critical under Regulation (EU) 2024/1252. The US Geological Survey uses a separate method that combines economic consequences, import reliance, production concentration and the willingness and ability of suppliers to continue supply. Every criticality claim must identify the jurisdiction, method and year.

Chinese export controls

China's measures form separate legal layers. Announcement No. 33 of 2024 established a general export-licensing regime for listed antimony-related and superhard-material items from 15 September 2024. It covers specified ores, raw materials, metal and products, high-purity oxides and compounds, indium antimonide, technologies and listed superhard-material equipment or know-how. Exporters must apply for a licence and supply end-user and end-use information. The Ministry of Commerce described the measure as a national-security and non-proliferation control that was not directed at a particular country.

Announcement No. 46 of 2024 then tightened controls for the United States from 3 December 2024. Its first paragraph prohibits exports of dual-use items to US military users or military uses. Its second paragraph stated that exports to the United States of listed gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard-material dual-use items would, in principle, not be licensed, while graphite items would receive stricter end-user and end-use review.

Announcement No. 72 of 2025 suspended the second paragraph of Announcement No. 46 from 9 November 2025 until 27 November 2026. As at 29 July 2026, it is therefore inaccurate to describe the US-specific presumption of denial for antimony as a current blanket ban. The suspension does not repeal Announcement No. 46, does not suspend its military-user and military-use prohibition, and does not remove the general antimony licensing regime under Announcement No. 33.

Announcement No. 10 of 2025 separately imposed licensing on specified tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium items from 4 February 2025. The tungsten schedule names particular compounds, solid tungsten and alloys meeting stated composition, dimension and performance thresholds, and related production technology. It is not a ban on all tungsten exports.

State nexus and strategic use

The export-control authority defines the legal scope, receives licence applications and applies end-use or destination rules. Producers, processors and exporters determine whether controlled supply exists and whether an approved shipment can be fulfilled. Defence customers require materials and components meeting specific technical standards. Target governments can respond through procurement, stockpiles, recycling, substitution, allied sourcing and support for new mines or processors.

This direct state nexus places the record in the main sequence. The declared rationale is national security and non-proliferation. The broader strategic purpose remains partly inferred because official legal texts do not establish the intended economic effect on every destination or sector. A licensing requirement, a presumption of denial, a destination-specific prohibition and a temporary suspension create different leverage and must retain their exact legal labels.

Effects, limits and responses

Exposure varies by stage and time horizon. US Geological Survey data show substantial US import reliance for both metals and identify China as an important source, but the denominator, averaging period, recycling contribution and commodity form determine what the figures mean. Production shares do not establish control of all processing stages or qualified defence components.

Restrictions can delay deliveries, raise compliance costs, change inventories and accelerate diversification. They do not prove a halt in weapons production or successful compellence. Prices also respond to demand, inventories, speculation, logistics, outages and anticipation. Any causal claim must identify the treatment date, affected product, comparison series and competing shocks.

The United States and European Union are pursuing resilience through critical-mineral policy, public funding and supply development. A July 2025 US Department of Defense award of US$6.2m funded a pre-feasibility study and related work for a Nevada tungsten project. It did not establish an operating mine. The central strategic question is whether diversification and qualification can mature before inventories and existing supply arrangements cease to buffer the restriction.

See also

Critical minerals weaponisation · Critical-mineral processing chokepoint · Tungsten, wolfram, and neutral-state ore trade (WWII) · Preclusive purchasing · Chinese graphite and antimony export controls (2023-present) · Gallium and germanium production, refining and export controls · Chinese critical minerals export controls (2010 to present) · Strategic stockpiling

Sources

1. Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China and General Administration of Customs, 'Announcement No. 33 of 2024 on export controls on antimony and related items', 15 August 2024. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2024/art_a4711acb06364199a3c5a06d7f2be6d8.html
2. Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 'Announcement No. 46 of 2024 on strengthening export controls on relevant dual-use items to the United States', 3 December 2024. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2024/art_3d5e990b43424e60828030f58a547b60.html
3. Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China and General Administration of Customs, 'Announcement No. 10 of 2025 on export controls on tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium related items', 4 February 2025. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_e623090907fc4e1092f0a4db72f57b95.html
4. Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 'Announcement No. 72 of 2025 adjusting implementation of Announcement No. 46 of 2024', 9 November 2025. https://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/claw/clawContent.shtml?id=104116
5. Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 'Ministry of Commerce Regular Press Conference', 22 August 2024. https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/News/PressConference/art/2024/art_1f1c8a333816408d944cd9a4d1c4b370.html
6. US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, version 1.3, May 2026. https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2026
7. US Geological Survey, 'Minerals with Net Import Reliance on China' (2025). https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/minerals-net-import-reliance-china
8. US Geological Survey, Production of mineral commodities and geospatial map of the mineral industries and related infrastructure of China, Open-File Report 2026-1018 (2026). https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/ofr20261018/full
9. European Union, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, 11 April 2024. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1252
10. US Geological Survey, Methodology and technical input for the 2025 US List of Critical Minerals, Open-File Report 2025-1047 (2025). https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/ofr20251047/full
11. US Department of Defense, 'Department of Defense Awards $6.2 Million to Sustain Critical Production of Tungsten', 22 July 2025. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4252264/department-of-defense-awards-62-million-to-sustain-critical-production-of-tungs/
12. European Parliament, 'Resolution of 10 July 2025 on tackling China's critical raw materials export restrictions', 2025/2800(RSP). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A52025IP0166