UN 1267 (ISIL and Al-Qaida) Sanctions Committee

The UN 1267 (ISIL and Al-Qaida) Sanctions Committee is a subsidiary body of the United Nations Security Council that oversees the sanctions regime established by Resolution 1267 and subsequently refined for ISIL and Al-Qaida. The committee is composed of Security Council members. It administers listing and delisting decisions under Council authority; member states implement the resulting measures through their own legal systems.

Measures and institutional roles

The regime requires an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo against listed individuals and entities. The committee maintains the list and issues implementation material. A Monitoring Team assists with analysis and implementation reporting. The Ombudsperson receives qualifying delisting requests and makes recommendations through the applicable procedure. The Secretariat supports these bodies. None of these functions replaces Security Council authority or national implementation.

The consolidated list was last updated on 8 July 2026 and then recorded 249 individuals and 88 entities. Those figures are dated to that update and require another check before publication. They are not permanent characteristics of the regime.

Legal and strategic significance

The committee provides a multilateral mechanism for targeted denial. Listing can block property, constrain travel and interrupt arms access across implementing jurisdictions without imposing a comprehensive embargo on an entire population. Its effect depends on national legislation, financial intermediaries, border systems and evidence supplied to the committee.

Due-process criticism has shaped the regime. European litigation in Kadi demonstrated that Council-derived measures still encounter review within domestic or regional legal orders. The Ombudsperson process added an institutional route for review, but the committee, Ombudsperson and courts retain different mandates. A listing is an administrative decision under the Council regime, not a criminal conviction.

The regime's strategic purpose is declared, but effectiveness varies with implementation, asset visibility and the target's ability to adapt. Committee administration should not be described as direct seizure by the United Nations.

Resolution 2734 renewed the Monitoring Team mandate in 2024 and preserved the regime's institutional architecture. Listing proposals still require committee consideration under the applicable procedures. Delisting can proceed through the Ombudsperson route for the ISIL and Al-Qaida list or through a state request. These routes differ in initiation and review, and neither makes the Ombudsperson the final sanctions authority.

The asset freeze reaches funds and economic resources controlled by listed parties under member-state implementation. It does not itself transfer title or authorise confiscation. The travel ban and arms embargo likewise depend on domestic authorities and defined exceptions. Treating all three measures as a single United Nations enforcement act would misstate the transmission chain.

The committee's consensus practice can strengthen multilateral legitimacy but also creates political constraints. Evidence supporting a listing may be sensitive, while affected parties seek sufficient reasons and review. Those tensions explain the bounded contestation in the regime without negating its current legal operation.

See also

United Nations Security Council · UNSCR 1267 (1999) · UN 1267 Ombudsperson (2009) · Kadi v Council and Commission (ECJ, 2008) · Economic statecraft

Sources

• United Nations Security Council, 1267 Committee, accessed 30 July 2026.
• United Nations, ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list, accessed 30 July 2026.
• United Nations, Office of the Ombudsperson, accessed 30 July 2026.
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 2734 (2024), accessed 30 July 2026.