Taiwan

Taiwan is a self-governing polity operating under the Republic of China constitutional order, with contested international status. Its government acts directly as sender, target, adapter and institutional designer through economic ministries, export-control law, industrial policy and external arrangements. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited and other firms are separately governed corporate actors, not government departments.

Public authority and corporate identity

The Republic of China constitution and central-government structure define the institutions through which public policy is adopted and administered (Office of the President, *Constitution of the Republic of China*; Central Government Structure). This institutional description does not resolve the international sovereignty dispute, which must remain explicit and separate from the operation of government in Taiwan.

TSMC is a listed company with its own board, shareholders, customers, facilities and commercial risks. Its 2025 annual report is the primary record for governance, fabrication footprint and company risk as at the reporting period (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited, *2025 Annual Report*). Corporate importance does not establish state direction. TSMC may act as a regulated intermediary when Taiwan, United States or other applicable rules govern a product, customer or destination.

Direct statecraft and industrial resilience

Taiwan's Strategic High-Tech Commodities system is direct public action administered by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Official guidance sets out the export-control process, while the current legal record identifies restrictions concerning Russia and Belarus (International Trade Administration, *Strategic High-Tech Commodities Frequently Asked Questions*, updated February 2026; Ministry of Economic Affairs restrictions, current at 29 July 2026). These measures are distinct from United States controls on advanced computing and semiconductor-manufacturing items (United States Bureau of Industry and Security, 7 October 2022). Which rule applies depends on jurisdiction, entity, product, destination and date.

Resilience and integration also form part of the statecraft portfolio. The National Development Council's Five Trusted Industry Sectors framework, updated 27 July 2026, identifies current industrial priorities beyond semiconductors alone (National Development Council, *Five Trusted Industry Sectors*). The Executive Yuan reported that an investment memorandum of understanding was signed on 15 January 2026 and that specified United States tariff concessions for non-semiconductor products took effect on 1 May 2026 (Executive Yuan, 28 May 2026). It also stated that some reciprocal tariff terms remained to be finalised. The memorandum, implementing instruments and current status must control any claim about legal effect.

Semiconductor concentration and contested deterrence

Taiwan's semiconductor ecosystem is a major node in advanced manufacturing, but claims of a singular global chokepoint require a defined product segment, technology generation, capacity measure and date. The silicon shield thesis argues that semiconductor concentration raises the cost of coercion or attack. Peer-reviewed analysis presents the thesis as contested and notes that concentration can create vulnerability as well as deterrent value (Steffi Weil, Joern Carsten Gottwald and Markus Taube, 2025). Geographic diversification may strengthen supply resilience while changing the strategic value assigned to concentration.

Blockade and quarantine effects are scenario-dependent. The Center for Strategic and International Studies' 2025 wargame explores specific assumptions concerning Chinese action, Taiwan's resilience and external intervention (CSIS, *Lights Out? Wargaming a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan*). A scenario is not a forecast. Any assessment must identify duration, inventories, shipping access, energy, communications, allied response and the behaviour of corporate networks.

Taiwan's statecraft significance therefore extends beyond TSMC. It lies in the interaction among public export controls, industrial investment, trade partnerships, corporate compliance and resilience planning under coercive pressure.

See also

TSMC · Chokepoint effect · Weaponised interdependence · United States advanced-computing and semiconductor controls on China (2022-present) · Foreign Direct Product Rule · PLA encirclement exercises and Taiwan blockade scenarios (2022-2025) · Semiconductor chokepoint · Economic containment

Sources

• Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), Constitution of the Republic of China.
• Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), Central Government Structure.
• Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited, 2025 Annual Report (2026).
• International Trade Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan, Frequently Asked Questions on Strategic High-Tech Commodities Export Controls, updated February 2026.
• Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan, Strategic High-Tech Commodities Export Restrictions concerning Russia and Belarus, current to 29 July 2026.
• National Development Council, Taiwan, Five Trusted Industry Sectors, updated 27 July 2026.
• Executive Yuan, Taiwan, United States Section 232 Tariff Concessions for Non-Semiconductor Products Are Effective 1 May 2026 (28 May 2026).
• United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce Implements New Export Controls on Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items to the People's Republic of China (7 October 2022).
• Steffi Weil, Joern Carsten Gottwald and Markus Taube, "The European Union, Taiwan, and the Silicon Shield Argument: A Conceptual Assessment through the Lens of Grand Theories", European Politics and Society 26, no. 2 (2025).
• Center for Strategic and International Studies, Lights Out? Wargaming a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan (2025).