Open-source intelligence platforms for economic-security investigation

Open-source intelligence platforms for economic-security investigation collect, preserve, search and analyse publicly or commercially available information against a defined requirement. A database, image, broadcast, corporate filing or vessel transmission is information, not intelligence by itself. It becomes open-source intelligence, or OSINT, through tasking, evaluation, corroboration and assessment. The platform is therefore enabling infrastructure. It enters economic statecraft only when a state or authorised intermediary uses the resulting intelligence for a documented strategic purpose.

Information, collection and assessment

Publicly available information is accessible to the public. Commercially available information is obtained by purchase, subscription or contract and remains subject to licence, privacy and continuity constraints. Leaked, stolen and classified material belong to different legal and evidential categories. Combining them under the label open source obscures provenance and authority.

The collection stack can include corporate and beneficial-ownership records, trade data, court filings, media, social platforms, technical data, satellite observations and cooperative vessel transmissions such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS). Vendors and investigators may fuse these records through entity resolution, graph analysis, geospatial tools and automated classification. Their output still requires analyst judgement. A model score or unmatched detection is an investigative lead, not a verified identity, legal conclusion or proof of hostile intent.

The United States intelligence community's 2024 strategy treats OSINT as an intelligence discipline and recognises both public and commercial information. NATO doctrine keeps OSINT distinct from signals and other intelligence disciplines. The Berkeley Protocol supplies detailed verification, preservation, security and ethical practices for digital investigations, but it was written for that investigative setting rather than as a universal intelligence manual.

Statecraft use chain

A statecraft claim should identify the requirement, collecting actor, analytic actor, decision authority and use. Intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, finance ministries, sanctions bodies, military commands and multilateral organisations may task or consume the work. Data vendors, satellite operators, registries, platforms, journalists and civil-society investigators may act as commercial or non-state intermediaries. None becomes a state sender merely because a government reads or procures its output.

Project Aegir is a bounded example. In July 2024 the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency selected Orbital Insight for a pilot applying commercial analytics to maritime activity. The award demonstrates government procurement and a stated requirement. It does not establish government-wide adoption, the accuracy of every vendor detection or a proven operational effect.

CleanSeaNet provides a more developed public-authority workflow. Satellite detections and other vessel information support alerts and analyst review, after which national authorities determine whether and how to investigate. This separates visibility from intelligence and intelligence from enforcement. The same discipline applies to sanctions work. Missing or manipulated AIS, an unmatched image and an unusual ownership chain may justify scrutiny, but none independently proves evasion or illegality.

Disclosure, verification and limits

Public attribution can widen an audience, support coalition coordination and expose conduct to market participants. It is a strategic choice, not the automatic endpoint of collection. Officials must weigh source protection, evidentiary disclosure, confidence, privacy, legal process and the risk that disclosure teaches an adversary how to adapt.

Commercial access broadens collection but can reduce reproducibility. Pricing, licensing, platform rules, geographic and language coverage, model changes and vendor continuity shape what analysts can see and whether another investigator can repeat the result. Open sources are neither inherently democratic nor self-authenticating. Sophisticated actors can suppress, manipulate or flood the observable record, while open societies may expose more data than closed systems.

Effect must be measured downstream. A publishable claim should connect the assessment to a designation, inspection, interdiction, prosecution, compliance decision, diplomatic action or documented behavioural change. Visibility and publicity alone do not establish deterrence or successful economic statecraft.

See also

Automatic Identification System (AIS) · Beneficial ownership registries and databases · Financial intelligence (FININT) · Commercial satellite imagery for maritime and economic-security intelligence

Sources

1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency, The IC OSINT Strategy 2024-2026 (2024).
2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-intelligence and Security, AJP-2, Edition B, Version 1.
3. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations (2022).
4. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, "Commercial GEOINT".
5. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, "NGA Selects Orbital Insight for First Commercial Solutions Opening", 23 July 2024.
6. United States Department of the Treasury, Department of State and Coast Guard, Sanctions Advisory for the Maritime Industry, Energy and Metals Sectors, and Related Communities, 14 May 2020.
7. International Maritime Organization, "Automatic Identification Systems".
8. European Maritime Safety Agency, "CleanSeaNet".
9. Fernando Paolo et al., "Satellite Mapping Reveals Extensive Industrial Activity at Sea", Nature 625 (2024): 85-91.
10. Global Fishing Watch, "Global Fishing Watch Map User Guide".
11. C4ADS, Oil and Water (2025).
12. Sam Dubberley, Alexa Koenig and Daragh Murray, eds., Digital Witness: Using Open Source Information for Human Rights Investigation, Documentation, and Accountability (Oxford University Press, 2020).