New Generation Warfare (NGW)

New Generation Warfare (NGW) is a contested analytical label derived from Russian military-theoretical writing about combinations of conventional, political, informational and economic means. It is not established as the title of a single, binding Russian doctrine. It overlaps with, but does not cure, the interpretive problems surrounding the "Gerasimov Doctrine".

Origin and development

The concept emerged from Russian military-theoretical writing in the early 2010s, with the 2013 Military Thought article by Chekinov and Bogdanov on the nature and content of new-generation war as a canonical statement, and General Valery Gerasimov's February 2013 article "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight" as the text most quoted in the West. Bartles's "Getting Gerasimov Right" (2016) situates that article as a Russian reading of how the West itself allegedly operates, colour revolutions, sanctions, information campaigns, and as foresight about future war, rather than a blueprint; Giles's Chatham House analysis emphasises the continuity of these tools with long-standing Soviet practice. NGW theory posits a rising ratio of non-military to military measures in achieving strategic goals, with the economy and population as primary battlespaces.

Economic and financial content

Economic and financial means appear in the theoretical literature, but their place in a specific campaign must be demonstrated rather than assumed from the NGW label. Western analysts have applied the frame to energy pressure, covert or opaque finance, trade restrictions and the economic effects of information activity. Each application requires evidence of the actor, authority, transaction or restriction, target and intended effect. State ownership of an energy company does not by itself prove that every supply or pricing decision is strategic direction. Likewise, intelligence involvement, cyber activity and financial flows should not be described as a unified campaign without evidence of coordination. In the stronger Western reading, these means seek to weaken cohesion and exploit vulnerabilities before or alongside military force; that reading remains an interpretation, not an official Russian campaign template.

Application

Analysts apply the label to Russian conduct against Ukraine and European states, including combinations of military force, information activity and economic pressure. Those applications must attribute each component separately. Concurrent sanctions, energy measures, cyber incidents and combat do not prove a unified campaign without evidence of authority and sequencing. The 2021 Russian National Security Strategy is an official policy source, while Chekinov, Bogdanov and Gerasimov are military-theoretical authors; neither category should be transferred into the other.

Contestation and limits

Three cautions attach. First, nomenclature: Russian doctrine is a contested interpretive field, and "NGW", "hybrid warfare", and "Gerasimov Doctrine" are Western organising labels of varying fidelity; NGW is the closest to actual Russian theoretical writing but is still a reconstruction. Second, novelty: Giles and others document deep continuity with Soviet active measures and economic levers, arguing the "new" is largely velocity and financialisation. Third, effectiveness: Russia's full-scale 2022 invasion, a conventional war of attrition, complicates strong readings of NGW as the Russian way of war, suggesting non-military primacy holds only in certain phases of competition.

See also

"Gerasimov Doctrine" (contested) · Hybrid warfare · Grey-zone competition · Malign finance · Energy weaponisation · Unrestricted warfare · Economic warfare · Economic statecraft

Sources

• President of Russia, National Security Strategy (2021; Russian; accessed 30 July 2026).
• S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War", Military Thought, no. 4 (2013).
• Charles K. Bartles, "Getting Gerasimov Right", Military Review 96, no. 1 (2016).
• Mark Galeotti, "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'" (2018).
• Keir Giles, *Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West* (Chatham House, 2016).