Actor

Jake Sullivan

Jake Sullivan served as US National Security Adviser from January 2021 to January 2025. He subsequently joined Harvard Kennedy School. His statecraft significance rests on documented policy arguments and his official co-ordination role during that tenure. Legal controls belong to the White House, Congress, Commerce Department and Bureau of Industry and Security under their respective authorities, not to Sullivan personally.

Public doctrine

In an April 2023 Brookings speech, Sullivan described a modern American industrial and international economic strategy. He defended public investment, resilient supply chains and co-operation with partners, while using the phrase "small yard, high fence" for controls on a limited set of security-sensitive technologies. The speech is primary evidence of his policy argument.

The formulation combined domestic capacity-building with denial. Subsidies and investment sought resilience and productive capability; export controls sought to restrict access to advanced computing and semiconductor-manufacturing capabilities. These are different mechanisms with different legal bases.

Government implementation

The Bureau of Industry and Security issued the October 2022 controls addressed in United States advanced-computing and semiconductor controls on China (2022-present). BIS, not Sullivan, administered the Export Administration Regulations and licensing. Sullivan's National Security Council role involved strategy and interagency co-ordination, but a rule's exact items, destinations and legal effect must come from the published rule.

The same institutional boundary applies to Russia-related measures adopted during his tenure. Treasury, Commerce and other agencies executed their own authorities. Daleep Singh and other officials had separate roles. Prominence in the policy process does not establish personal authorship of each measure.

Current role and assessment

Harvard's current profile records Sullivan's academic appointment after government. That position does not carry US executive authority. Statements made in the later role should be distinguished from official acts between 2021 and 2025.

The "small yard" proposition remains contested. Critics argue that controls expanded, left gaps or accelerated substitution. Those propositions belong to Export control as strategic instrument and the Self-undermining arsenal hypothesis. They require dated evidence about controlled items, licence outcomes, target capability and alternatives.

Sullivan is therefore classified as a direct government official and institutional designer for the official period, with declared intent supported by the Brookings speech. Current office, rule coverage and numerical claims require publication-day review.

Implementation test

The doctrine should be evaluated through the legal instruments that followed it. Export-control rules, investment restrictions, allied arrangements, industrial subsidies and diplomatic statements have different authorities and targets. Sullivan could co-ordinate and advocate within the White House, but the Commerce Department, Treasury Department, Congress and partner governments made their own legally attributable decisions.

The phrase "small yard, high fence" is therefore a strategic description, not a self-executing rule. Review should identify whether the defined yard remained limited to stated security technologies, how technical thresholds changed, which destinations and end users were covered, and what licensing or enforcement followed. Expansion or contraction should be measured against dated rules rather than rhetoric alone.

Effectiveness also has several dimensions. A control can delay acquisition, raise cost or improve allied alignment without permanently preventing substitution. It may also encourage domestic development by the target or impose costs on suppliers. A defensible assessment specifies the intended capability effect, the counterfactual source of supply, the observed time period and any adaptation. Current academic commentary by Sullivan may explain his reasoning, but it does not alter the authority or meaning of earlier legal instruments.

See also

Daleep Singh · United States advanced-computing and semiconductor controls on China (2022-present) · Export control as strategic instrument · Self-undermining arsenal

Sources

Recommended citation

Cite this entry

Tennant, James J., ed. 'Jake Sullivan.' The Encyclopedia of Economic Statecraft, version 2.0, last reviewed 30 July 2026. https://jamesjtennant.com/entries/jake-sullivan/.

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