International Working Group on Russian Sanctions (Yermak-McFaul Group)

The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, commonly called the Yermak-McFaul Group, is an expert initiative that develops recommendations for sanctions against the Russian Federation. It is associated with the Office of the President of Ukraine and Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute. It is not a government body, intergovernmental organisation or sanctions authority.

Formation and output

The group emerged in 2022 after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Ukrainian presidential office presented its first action plan in April 2022. Stanford hosts a public record of members, papers and institutional descriptions. Membership, affiliations and capacities must be dated because the participants are living people and the list can change.

Action Plan 1.0 recommended measures across finance, energy, trade, transport, technology and individual targeting. Later plans revised and extended the programme, including Action Plan 2.0 in 2023 and Action Plan 4.0 in 2025. The papers are advocacy and analysis. They do not create legal obligations.

Relationship to policy

National governments, the European Union and other competent bodies enact sanctions through their own instruments. Similarity between a group recommendation and a later government measure does not establish authorship, adoption or causal influence. Evidence of influence requires an official acknowledgment, documented consultation or another reliable record.

The group's analysis can help compare policy options, map targets and identify implementation gaps. Quantitative claims depend on stated models, assumptions, data vintages and authors. Member participation does not prove consensus on every paper unless the publication says so.

Statecraft significance and safeguards

The group belongs in context because expert networks can shape the information environment around coalition statecraft. Its recommendations seek denial, degradation and compellence, while its public work also signals priorities to governments, firms and civil society.

Independence, implementation rates, sanctions effects and conflicts of interest require evidence and qualification. Target recommendations and allegations must be attributed exactly, with a response where material. Current-war claims and impact estimates require a publication-day refresh. The group, the Ukrainian presidency, Stanford, KSE Institute and individual authors must remain institutionally distinct.

See also

KSE Institute · Coalition sanctions and export controls against Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022-present) · Oil price cap · Central-bank reserve immobilisation and confiscation · Group of Seven (G7) · Economic Kill Chain (EKC)

Sources

• Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 'The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions', current membership, papers and disclosures checked 29 July 2026.
• Office of the President of Ukraine, 'Yermak-McFaul International Expert Group Presents an Action Plan' (20 April 2022).
• International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, Action Plan on Strengthening Sanctions against the Russian Federation (19 April 2022).
• International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, Action Plan 2.0 (24 April 2023).
• International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, Action Plan 4.0 (2025).
• Oleg Itskhoki and Elina Ribakova, 'The Economics of Sanctions: From Theory into Practice', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2024).