Cross-border oil and gas pipelines: Nord Stream, Druzhba and Power of Siberia

Cross-border oil and gas pipelines are fixed-route transport systems through which states can pursue integration, supply assurance, transit leverage, denial and coercion. Nord Stream, Druzhba and Power of Siberia carry different commodities through different legal and physical systems. Infrastructure creates potential leverage, but statecraft begins only when a public authority or state-directed operator activates a specific control point for a defined objective.

Three different systems

Nord Stream 1 transported natural gas from Russia to Germany beneath the Baltic Sea. Nord Stream 2 was completed but never entered commercial operation. Germany's Bundesnetzagentur suspended its certification procedure on 16 November 2021. The explosions of September 2022 damaged both systems. Swedish and Danish investigations concluded that deliberate sabotage occurred, but closed without attributing state responsibility. Later German proceedings concerning alleged individual participation are not a final finding about state responsibility.

Druzhba transports crude oil, not gas, from Russia and Belarus towards refineries in Central Europe. Its pumping stations, transit branches, metering points, connected refineries and national import rules form a distinct set of control points. Gas volumes and oil volumes must therefore never be combined in one measure.

Power of Siberia transports natural gas from eastern Russia to China. Deliveries began in December 2019. Technical design levels, annual contractual ramp-up and realised deliveries are different quantities. The line supports Russia's eastward market reorientation, but it does not make gas from western fields or former European routes instantly transferable to China.

Statecraft through infrastructure

Producing, transit and consuming states act through ownership, certification, sanctions, import law and resilience policy. Pipeline companies and transmission-system operators implement flows and maintenance within those legal and contractual settings. A reduction in flow is not automatically coercion. The claim requires an identified decision-maker, official explanation, alternative explanations, target, timing and strategic demand.

Nord Stream 2 certification, Russian gas-flow reductions, European diversification and the later European Union import prohibition are separate acts by separate authorities. On 26 January 2026, the Council gave final approval to a stepwise prohibition on Russian gas imports. Imports under short-term pipeline contracts have been prohibited since 17 June 2026, while imports under long-term pipeline contracts are scheduled to end by 30 September 2027, or 1 November 2027 if the regulation's storage condition applies. Those dates require a current-law check before publication.

Dependency, substitution and disruption

Pipeline dependence can be asymmetric without being one-sided. Suppliers receive revenue and invest in route-specific production, while consumers depend on continuous delivery. Transit states may gain fees and control over junctions. Physical damage can deny all parties use of the asset regardless of the original commercial bargain.

LNG, storage, alternative pipelines, conservation and fuel switching reduced European exposure after 2022. Each imposed costs, infrastructure needs and time constraints. The adjustment portfolio weakened pipeline leverage, but did not make energy supply frictionless or prove one motive for every earlier interruption.

The record remains in the main sequence because states have repeatedly acted through defined pipeline control points. It does not assign agency to the pipes themselves.

See also

Energy weaponisation · Gas-transit and pipeline coercion · Liquefied natural gas technology and terminals · Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, 2022 · United States sanctions concerning Nord Stream 2 (2017-2022) · EU gas-demand reduction, storage and LNG diversification (2022-2023) · United States extraterritorial controls in the Siberian gas pipeline dispute (1981-1982) · Gazprom · Weaponised interdependence · Economic Kill Chain (EKC)

Sources

• Bundesnetzagentur, "Certification procedure for Nord Stream 2 suspended" (16 November 2021).
• International Energy Agency, "2022 energy crisis: frequently asked questions" (16 December 2022).
• International Energy Agency, "Anatomy of a natural gas crisis," in Gas Market Lessons from the 2022 to 2023 Energy Crisis (2025).
• International Energy Agency, "Energy fact sheet: why does Russian oil and gas matter?" (21 March 2022).
• United States Energy Information Administration, "Russia country analysis" (updated 2025).
• United States Energy Information Administration, "Russia's natural gas and coal exports have been decreasing and shifting toward Asia" (15 July 2025).
• Council of the European Union, "Ending Russian energy imports" (checked 29 July 2026).
• Council of the European Union, "Russian gas imports: Council gives final greenlight to a stepwise ban" (26 January 2026).
• Swedish Security Service, "Investigation into gross sabotage has been closed" (7 February 2024).
• Danish Security and Intelligence Service and Copenhagen Police, "Joint investigation into the Nord Stream explosions is closed" (26 February 2024).
• Office of the German Federal Prosecutor, "Arrest in connection with the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines" (30 September 2025).
• Thane Gustafson, The Bridge: Natural Gas in a Redivided Europe (Harvard University Press, 2020).