China (People's Republic)

The People's Republic of China is a major economic-statecraft actor. It uses inducement, integration, market access, finance, industrial policy, technology controls, resource leverage and coercive restrictions, while adapting to foreign controls directed at China. Economic warfare is one possible intensity within this wider record, not a description of all Chinese economic policy.

Roles and state nexus

China acts as sender, target, adapter and institutional designer. William J. Norris distinguishes formal state control from the variable conduct of policy banks, state-owned enterprises and private firms, while James Reilly describes how Chinese authorities orchestrate economic actors without eliminating their separate incentives (Norris, 2016; Reilly, 2021). State statutes, public finance and formal controls have a direct nexus. Commercial restrictions, regulatory pressure and informal boycotts require actor-specific evidence before they can be attributed to the central state.

The coercive record includes the linked cases on the 2010 rare-earth episode against Japan, Norway salmon restrictions, THAAD-related pressure on South Korea, Australia campaign and Lithuania campaign. Those cases differ in instrument, attribution and outcome. They do not establish one uniform method or a consistent rate of success. Audrye Wong's account also places coercion beside inducement and subversion, preventing a punishment-only reading of Chinese statecraft (Wong, 2026).

Authorities and economic security

China has built a formal legal architecture for economic-security action. The Ministry of Commerce issued the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List on 19 September 2020. The Export Control Law took effect on 1 December 2020. The Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures followed on 9 January 2021, and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law was adopted on 10 June 2021.

These authorities have different triggers and consequences. The Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law provides for countermeasures, prohibitions and a civil remedy; it does not generally criminalise compliance with foreign sanctions. English translations must be identified as official, unofficial or for reference. Measures involving critical minerals also require a commodity, production stage, date and issuing authority. The United States described later rare-earth licensing commitments in its account of the November 2025 bilateral arrangement, but that account is not a jointly authenticated legal text (White House, 1 November 2025).

Resilience and counter-infrastructure

China also seeks resilience against foreign financial and technology controls. The Cross-border Interbank Payment System reported RMB 180 trillion in business volume for 2025 on its official site, current to 14 July 2026. The People's Bank of China's 2024 payment-system report supplies the official earlier series. CIPS, e-CNY and mBridge are separate systems with different operators, functions and maturity. CIPS data do not establish displacement of SWIFT, and no current primary source supports a fixed claim that a stated share of CIPS transactions depends on SWIFT messaging.

Resilience measures can support prosperity, access and order-building as well as preparation for coercive pressure. A Taiwan-contingency purpose must be sourced or identified as inference. The secure assessment is that China combines broad economic engagement with formal controls, selective coercion and institutional adaptation, and that the effects vary by instrument and target.

See also

Coordinated economic coercion · Anti-sanctions architecture · Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (China, 2021) · Military-Civil Fusion (Civil-Military Fusion) · Critical minerals weaponisation · CIPS · Compliance dilemma · Economic statecraft · Economic warfare

Sources

• William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control (Cornell University Press, 2016).
• James Reilly, Orchestration: China's Economic Statecraft Across Asia and Europe (Oxford University Press, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197526347.001.0001.
• Audrye Wong, Subversion and Seduction: China's Economic Statecraft (Oxford University Press, 2026), https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197823187.001.0001.
• Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List, Order No. 4 of 2020 (19 September 2020).
• National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted 17 October 2020, effective 1 December 2020).
• National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law adopted (10 June 2021).
• Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures, Order No. 1 of 2021 (9 January 2021).
• Cross-border Interbank Payment System, official site and operational data, current to 14 July 2026.
• People's Bank of China, Report on China's Payment System 2024 (26 December 2025).
• White House, President Donald J. Trump Strikes Deal on Economic and Trade Relations with China (1 November 2025).